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Abstract 
 
The classical approaches to the modeling of sex ratio evolution can be divided into two classes. 
The first class contains the static strategic models related to the Dusing Fisher Shaw Mohler 
fitness measure, based on the reproductive value of the offspring of the focal female. The second 
class contains the population genetic models focused on the dynamics of the allele frequencies. 
The approaches are not fully compatible because the strategic models disregard the role of the 
male individuals as the passive carriers of the strategy genes. In the previous two papers in this 
cycle, a new synthetic model combining the strategic analysis with more rigorous genetics was 
presented. The new model shows that sex ratio self-regulation is a multistage complex process 
which can be regarded as an example of multilevel selection. One of the elements of this process 
is the dynamic equilibrium between male and female gene carriers associated with convergence 
of the dynamics to the manifold termed the male subpopulation equilibrium (MSE). This paper 
attempts to explain this phenomenon and analyze its properties. We show that the MSE 
phenomenon affects every stage of sex ratio self-regulation (Lemmas 1-4). The MSE plays a 
crucial role in synchronizing two levels of selection in the double-level selection process.  We 
show that the MSE condition can be generalized as an interesting synergistic property allowing 
for the estimation of the primary sex ratio of the entire population according to the state of some 
arbitrarily chosen subpopulation (Lemma 5). We also show that the classical Dusing Fisher Shaw 
Mohler fitness measure is a biased approximation of the new approach, but that it produces 
compatible strategic predictions (Lemma 6).     
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1. Introduction 
Sex ratio evolution was the first problem in evolutionary theory that involved mathematical 
reasoning. This was done by German biologist Carl Dusing [1]. He argued that the fitness of a 
female using a particular sex ratio strategy can be described by the number of her grandchildren. 
By application of this fitness measure it can be shown that the average strategy of females equal 
to 0.5 is evolutionarily stable. However, the population genetic approach focused on tracing the 
gene frequencies produces different predictions [2,3,4]. It shows that stable population states 
should be characterized by stable compositions of the female but also male subpopulation, not 
only by average strategy of females as, for example, in basic game theoretic approaches (see 
Introduction section in [6] for detailed discussion). In two previous papers [6,7], an alternative 
synthetic approach to modeling sex ratio evolution was introduced. The new model focuses on 
the dynamics of sex ratio evolution and tries to combine the phenotypic strategic approach with 
rigorous genetic analysis. This means that it explicitly considers parental male individuals as the 
passive carriers of female sex ratio strategies which can be expressed by their daughters if they 
inherit the strategy from the father. The first formulation [6], is focused on the trajectories of 
global population parameters such as the primary and the secondary sex ratios and showed that 
sex ratio evolution dynamics are biphasic. This is caused by fact that equations describing male 
subpopulation and the secondary sex ratio converge to their stable manifolds faster than female 
subpopulation. During the first, rapid phase, the population converges to equality between the 
primary and the secondary sex ratios. Here we are approaching the topic of this paper. During the 
rapid phase, the male subpopulation is attracted by the unique state, conditional on the current 
state of the female subpopulation, called the male subpopulation equilibrium (thus the dynamics 
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converge to the MSE manifold. See sections 2, 3 and 5.3 in [6] for details). This phenomenon is 
caused by the mechanism of fitness exchange, a contribution of an individual to the fitness of 
individuals of other types by producing newborns of their type (see section 2 and appendix C in 
[6] for details). This result shows that the role of passive male carriers as fathers, not only as 
sons, is also very important. This riddle was partially solved in the second paper [7], which is 
focused on the selection of genes encoding individual strategies. Selection of these genes depends 
only on sex ratios in carrier subpopulations rather than directly on trait values encoded by such 
genes (this self-regulation process can be called Fisherian Mechanism see section 2 and 3.1 in [7] 
for details). However, sex ratios in carrier subpopulations are determined by the action of female 
carriers of these genes and female partners of male carriers randomly drawn from the population 
in the process called Tug of War (see section 3.2 in [7]). This means that the activity of female 
carriers attracts the sex ratio among carriers of the particular gene to the value of the encoded by 
that gene and the activity of random female partners attracts it to the actual value of the primary 
sex ratio.  The Fisherian Mechanism and Tug of war together constitute the process which was 
termed double level selection. The question arise on the role of the MSE phenomenon in double 
level selection .When the MSE state is reached, selection on strategies appears to work according 
to the values encoded by the genes (this was shown by lemma 2 in [6]). The new theory produces 
predictions similar to the classical theory; however, the mechanistic interpretation of the MSE 
phenomenon remains a mystery and will be analyzed in the present paper. Thus the main goal of 
this paper is to investigate the properties of the dynamic self-regulation mechanisms discovered 
in [7]  (i.e. Fisherian Mechanism, Tug of  War) and their relationships in the process of the 
double level selection when the trajectory reaches the close neighbourhood of the MSE manifold 
(sections 2 and 3). This will reveal the importance of the MSE mechanism in the dynamics of sex 
ratio self-regulation. The next step is investigation of the role of the MSE in the adjustment of 
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fitness exchange mechanism (section 4), which will reveal some intriguing properties of this 
phenomenon (section 5). Those results will allow comparison of the classical Dusing-Fisher-
Shaw-Mohler fitness measure with analogous static fitness function prepared according to the 
new model.  
However, it should be emphasized that the MSE is a specific example of the more general 
problem. The impact of the passive carriers of unexpressed genes (strategies) on the proliferation 
of those genes (strategies) may appear in many applications of population genetics and 
evolutionary game theory. Similar dynamic population equilibria can emerge in problems other 
than sex ratio evolution, where some fraction of individuals do not exhibit inherited traits, but 
transfer them to their offspring.  
 Next subsections will recall the formal details of the model presented in [6] and [7] and briefly 
summarize the results obtained there. However, please note that for full understanding of the 
presented results reading the [6] and [7] would be necessary. From section 2 new results will be 
presented.  
 
1.1 Formal details of the model presented in the previous papers 
 Assume that a strategies are expressed by female carriers (as in basic game theoretic approaches 
and in Dusing’s model [1]). There are u  individual strategies encoding the sex ratio among 
newborns of the female, described by ]1,0[iP . There are ix  female and iy  male carriers of the 
strategy iP  in the population. Therefore, the population consists of ii xx   females and 
ii yy   males. Thus, ],...,[ 1 ufff   is the vector of frequencies of strategies of the female 
subpopulation, and ],...,[ 1 ummm   is an analogous vector for the male subpopulation (where 
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x
x
f ii   and 
y
y
m ii  ). 
xy
y
P

  is the fraction of males in the population (a secondary sex 
ratio), and jjj Pf  is the mean female subpopulation strategy (the primary sex ratio).  Assume 
that each female produces k  offspring according to haploid inheritance (with probability 0.5 for 
gene transfer from the focal parent). However, males are gene carriers too, and transfer those 
genes to their offspring. The influence of males can be described by the fitness exchange effect 
(i.e. daughters of male carriers affect the payoff of female carriers and sons of females affect 
payoff of males). This allows for derivation of the sex specific payoff functions, which is outlined 
below (see [6] Appendix C for detailed derivation).  In [6] it was shown that 
 
y
xk
PfW jjjmm  5.0  is the number of male offspring, and   
y
xk
PfW jjjmf  15.0  is the 
number of female offspring, of the male individual. These functrions are average values of 
binomial distribution, where a trial is the production of a newborn (xk/y trials for a single male) 
and a success is the production of the individual of sex specified by the function (drawn with 
probability jjj Pf  for male and  jjj Pf  1  for female newborn), carrying the strategy gene 
from focal parental individual (with probability 0.5). Analogously, kPW ifm )1(5.0   is the 
number of female offspring, and kPW iff 5.0  is the number of male offspring, of the female 
individual (k trials for a single female). Therefore we have the payoff functions for males 
andfemales, respectively, as: 
 







  i
i
i
jjjfm
i
i
mmim P
m
f
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P
P
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y
x
WmfPPW
2
1
),,,(      – payoff function of males,    (1) 
      





 jjj
i
i
imf
i
i
ffif Pf
f
m
P
k
W
x
y
WmfPPW 11
2
,,,    – payoff function of females,  (2) 
describing per capita number of newborns of the same sex and carried strategy than the focal 
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individual. Now we have all elements needed to formulate the multi-population replicator 
dynamics [8]. In the first paper [6], this took the following form: 
   mfPWmfPPWff fifii ,,),,,(        for  )1,...,1(  ui  
   mfPWmfPPWmm mimii ,,),,,(       for  )1,...,1(  ui  
   mfPWmfPWPP m ,,),,(   , 
where ),,,(),,( mfPPWmmfPW imiim  ,    mfPPWfmfPW ifiif ,,,,,  ,  
   mfPWPmfPWPmfPW fm ,,)1(),,(,,   are the respective average payoff functions of 
the male, female and the whole population (see [6] Appendix D for derivation). This leads to the 
following system of equations (see [6] Appendix E for derivation): 
   











 jjji
i
i
i
i Pff
m
P
f
kf 1
2
1
2
       for  )1,...,1(  ui           (3) 
  jjjiiii PfmPfP
Pk
m 




 

1
2
                    for  )1,...,1(  ui                      (4) 
  PPfPkP jjj  )1( .                                                                                (5)       
It was shown that, for biological reasons, we can limit the analysis of the model to values of the 
primary and the secondary sex ratios over the interval )1,0( . The above formulation is similar to 
population genetics models and is focused on the composition of the whole population. In [7] the 
model was modified by a change of coordinates where  11,...,  uGGG  is the vector of gene 
frequencies in the whole population (where 
yx
yx
G iii


 ), and  ],...,[ 1 uMMM   
(where
ii
i
i
yx
y
M

 ) is the vector of the sex ratios in the subpopulations of  carriers of the same 
strategy genes. This allows taking the perspective of a gene as a strategic agent. The fitness 
function of a gene encoding strategy Pi (interpreted as the average payoff of the adult carrier of 
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the i-th gene) described in the above coordinates and discussed in details in section 2 and 
appendix B in [7], is therefore: 
 
 







 iiifiimiig MM
P
Pk
MGPWMMGPWMMGPW 1
1
2
),,()1(),,(),,( .    (6)  
Note that fitness function Wg is independent of the value encoded by individual strategy Pi. The 
fitness of a gene is determined by the sex ratio in a subpopulation of its carriers, Mi. This leads to 
an alternative form of replicator equations (see section 2 and appendix C in [7]): 
 ),,(),,,( mfPWmfPPWGG igii           dynamics of gene frequencies 
 
  ),,,(),,,( mfPPWmfPPWMM igimii     dynamics of sex ratios in carriers subpopulations 
which take the form: 
 











 1
2
1
P
M
PkGG iii
             for )1,...,1(  ui                       (7)               
     










 
 iiiiprii MPMMP
P
P
M
k
M 1
1
2
        for ),...,1( ui  .                    (8) 
 An analysis of the replicator equations based on the fitness function Wg  (see [7] sections 3.1 and 
4.2) shows that changes in a gene pool can be described by the following inequalities: 
iG   increases when  
2
1
P    and   iMP     or   
2
1
P    and   iMP  , 
 iG   decreases when   
2
1
 PM i     or    
2
1
 PM i ,                    (9) 
 iG   is constant when  0iG   or  PM i     or  
2
1
P  . 
This process can be described as the Fisherian mechanism (see sections 3.1 and 4.2 in [7] for 
details). Thus gene pool dynamics depends on the current value of the secondary sex ratio P  and 
the sex ratio in the subpopulation of carriers of a gene iM . Parameter Mi is determined by the 
action of female carriers of strategy Pi as well as partners of male carriers of this strategy in a so-
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called tug of war mechanism, which means that the activity of female carriers attracts Mi to the 
value encoded by the gene Pi and the action of partners of male carriers attracts Mi to the value of 
the females’ average strategy prP . 
 
1.2 The male subpopulation equilibrium phenomenon 
The role of the male subpopulation composition was shown by population genetic models of sex 
ratio evolution [2,3,4,5]. In the MSE state (see sections 2.2 and 5.2 in [6] for details), the 
condition 
 priii PmPf                                                                                                                             (10)  
is satisfied, and the subpopulation of males is in the state









pr
u
u
pr
MSE
P
P
f
P
P
fm ,...,11 . The 
dynamics of the female subpopulation are then described by the rules (according to Lemma 1 in 
[6]): 
 
 if   increases when  2
1prP    and  ipr PP        or     2
1prP   and  ipr PP  , 
 
 if   decreases when  2
1 pri PP       or      2
1 pri PP ,                                            (11) 
 
 if   is stable when:  0if     or   1if     or   pri PP  . 
 
Note that this mechanism is similar to the Fisherian mechanism of evolution of gene frequencies 
(9). This suggests that the role of the MSE is important in the process of sex ratio self-regulation. 
The influence of male carriers is more important for the behavior of the system than the value of 
the secondary sex ratio P . The MSE is described by the unclear, nonintuitive 
condition priii PmPf   (see section 4.4 in [7]). This paper will attempt to elucidate the nature of 
the MSE and specify how it affects the Fisherian and "tug of war" mechanisms. Thus, the next 
section starts the presentation of the new results. 
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2. The relationship between the MSE and the "tug of war" mechanism  
As shown in the previous article [7] (sections 3.2 and 4.3 there), the sex ratio of the 
subpopulation of carriers of a given gene is self-regulated by the so-called "tug of war" 
mechanism mentioned here at the end of section 1.1 and this mechanism is described for each 
strategy by the equation:  
    










 
 iiiiprii MPMMP
P
P
M
k
M 1
1
2
  for  ),...,1( ui  .                           (8)  
How does the MSE phenomenon determines equilibria and the dynamics of the "tug of war" 
process? The solution to this problem is described below by the following lemmas. Consider first 
how the MSE affects the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation iM :  
 
Lemma 1 
When the MSE condition (10) for strategy iP  is satisfied, then according to the current value 
of prP , we have: 
 
ipr
i
i
PP
P
M

              










 PP
PP
P
M pr
ipr
i
i       when 
1
          (12) 
 
and if the MSE condition is satisfied for all i , then the condition PPpr   can be maintained 
despite changes in gene frequencies iG . 
For proof see Appendix 1. 
 
Therefore, the MSE state is equivalent to the unique sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation iM , 
and it is a necessary condition to make equality of the primary and the secondary sex ratios stable 
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despite changes in gene frequencies. The question arises about the role of iM  in the "tug of war" 
process. 
 
Lemma 2 
 
a) iM  is not a stationary point of the dynamics (8), but for the current value of prP , the 
dynamics is attracted by the point 
 
pri
pri
i
PP
PP
M


2ˆ .                                                                                      (13) 
 
b) If 5.0prP  and prPP   then ii MM
ˆ  for all i , which means that all subpopulations of 
carriers are in stable states. 
For a proof see Appendix 2. 
 
The value of iM  determined by the MSE of the individual strategy iP , is very important. This 
parameter is an argument of the fitness function of a gene gW  (6). Different strategies converge 
to different values of iM , and through these values, they can be distinguished by natural selection 
operating on a second, higher level of double level selection. In addition, the male subpopulation 
equilibrium is not equivalent to certain stable sex ratios in the carrier subpopulation, but it affects 
the evolution of this parameter by determining the value of the attractor iMˆ . In a sense, iM  is a 
“wolf” that chases a “rabbit” iMˆ  during the run on the MSE manifold. “Wolves” of all 
subpopulations catch their rabbits at the global equilibrium point. 
 
3. The influence of the MSE on gene frequencies and the primary sex ratio 
Another question addresses the influence of the male subpopulation equilibrium on gene 
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frequencies. The lemma described below shows that this influence plays a crucial role in the 
phenomenon of sex ratio self-regulation. When the MSE condition is satisfied then the dynamics 
(9) is driven by encoded values of individual strategies. The lemma below describes the 
relationship between gene frequency iG  and the frequency of its carriers among females if :          
Lemma 3 
 
If the MSE condition (10) is satisfied, prPP   and population is in the polymorphic state, then: 
 )1( priii PPfG  .                                                                                               (14) 
 
Parameter iG  changes according to the following rules. For iG >0: 
 iG   increases when  
2
1
prP    and   ipr PP     or   
2
1
prP    and   ipr PP    
 iG   decreases when  
2
1
 pri PP     or    
2
1
 pri PP                                         (15) 
and 
 iG   is stable when  0iG   or  pri PP    or  
2
1
prP . 
 
For a proof see Appendix 3.   
 
This result shows that the male subpopulation equilibrium determines the relationship between 
changes in a gene pool and frequencies of strategies in the female subpopulation. Therefore, 
changes in gene frequencies are synchronized with changes in the mean female subpopulation 
strategy (the primary sex ratio )prP . The dynamics of iG  are similar to the dynamics of if  ((11), 
see also Lemma 1 from [6]) and have the same stationary points. This is explained by the 
relationship (14).  
4. The effect of the MSE on the sex-specific payoff functions (1) and (2) and the 
“fitness exchange” effect 
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Let us examine the form of payoff functions if a population is in the MSE state.  
Recall that male and female payoff functions (1) and (2) describe numbers of newborns of the 
same sex and carrying the same strategy than the focal individual. Lemma 4 describes the 
quantitative properties of the “fitness exchange” mechanism in the MSE state and its impact on 
sex-specific payoffs.   
Lemma 4 
When the MSE condition is satisfied and PPpr   then: 
(i) prfm
i
i P
k
W
y
x

2
 and a male's payoff (1) takes the form prm PkW    
(ii)  imf
i
i P
k
W
x
y

2
    and a female's payoff (2) has the form       iif PP
k
W 1
2
  
(iii)  MSE condition (10) is equivalent to 
kPykPx priii  , 
 which means that all female carriers of gene iP  produce the same number of sons as partners of 
all male carriers of that gene. 
For a proof, see Appendix 4 
 
However, above lemma shows not only the forms of sex-specific payoffs on the MSE manifold. 
It reveals some interesting relationships. The reproductive values of the female and male carries 
are 
2
k
 and 
2
k
.  Point (i) shows that the female carriers of a gene produce prP
k

2
 new male 
carriers per single adult male carrier of this gene (the same as his own partners (mates)). In effect, 
the payoff of every male in the population, irrespective of the carried strategy, is equal to prPk . 
Thus the reproductive value of the “genetic sons” (carrying the same strategy than a focal parent) 
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of the focal male equals the reproductive value of the contribution of female carriers to his 
payoff. 
 Similarly, male carriers of a gene produce iP
k

2
 new female carriers per single adult female 
carrier of this gene, leading to (ii).  Note that the reproductive value of “genetic nieces” of the 
focal female, produced by male carriers is iP
k

4
2
 and equals the reproductive value of the 
“genetic sons” of that female (since she produces iP
k
2
 male carriers).  Thus: 
Corollary 1 
In the MSE state, the reproductive value of the contribution of the opposite sex gene carriers to 
the payoff of the focal individual equals the reproductive value of the newborn male carriers 
produced by that individual. 
 Point (iii) provides a more intuitive interpretation of point (i), showing that in the MSE state, 
evolution of the carriers’ subpopulations sex ratio iM  is driven by the fact that both groups of all 
female carriers and partners of all male carriers produces the same number of sons but different 
numbers of daughters. Every single male in the population produces the same number of 
daughters, despite carried strategies. However, different proportions 
i
i
x
y
for different strategies 
cause differences in the influence of males on female payoffs. This pattern appears to be an effect 
of the inheritance system (in this case haploid). 
 
5. The relationship between global and carrier subpopulation parameters. 
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Lemma 4 shows that the payoff of each male individual is equal, irrespective of his carried 
strategy. This leads to another surprising property of the MSE and the “fitness exchange” 
mechanism that affects not only individuals carrying the same strategy, but the population as a 
whole. Similarly to point (iii) of Lemma 4, since
x
x
f ii   and
y
y
m ii  , the MSE condition (10) is 
equivalent to: 
 i
i
i
jjj
P
y
x
Pf
y
x
                  iipr PP   .                                                                (16) 
This means that the product of the number of females per single male 
y
x
 and the primary sex 
ratio in the entire population jjj Pf  is equal to the analogous coefficients for monomorphic 
subpopulations of carriers of any gene iP . This property can be generalized.  
Consider the subpopulation described as , consisting of all carriers of arbitrarily chosen 
strategies described by the vector of indices ],...,[ 1


 
u
ddd  (for example  4,3,1  means, that 
carriers of strategies 431 ,, PPP  are chosen). Assume that 
  is the number of females per single 
male individual, and 

prP  is the mean strategy of females from subpopulation   (i.e., the 
subpopulation primary sex ratio). Then point (iii) from Lemma 4 can be generalized to the 
interesting property described by the following lemma. 
Lemma 5 
When the MSE condition is satisfied, then for subpopulation  , the following condition is 
satisfied: 
 
 prpr PP ,                                                                                                              (17) 
 
In particular, i
i
pr PP   for a monomorphic subpopulation of carriers of strategy iP  for 
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which
i
ii
y
x
 . 
For a proof see Appendix 5.  
 
The result obtained above has an interesting application. Condition  prpr PP  allows the 
estimation of the primary sex ratio of the entire population by parameters of an arbitrarily chosen 
subpopulation. There is no need to know all strategies in the population. We need only one 
genotype (or a few) encoding an individual strategy. By analyzing a subpopulation of carriers of 
these genes, we can estimate the primary sex ratio of the whole population as  




pr
pr
P
P .             (18)  
6. Comparison of the new theory with classical Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler 
approach 
 
This section examines the results of the classical theory according to the new approach. 
Numerical solutions for the new model suggest that both approaches produce compatible 
predictions, if the male subpopulation equilibrium condition (MSE) is satisfied. However, there is 
no formal proof supporting these observations. In addition, the interpretation of the classical 
fitness measure as a Malthusian growth rate is problematic from the perspective of the new 
model. The classical static fitness measure (described as DFSM fuction in [6]) relies on the 
number of grand offspring of a female, which expresses her individual strategy: 
 




 









 ii
kiik
i P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
PPPW
1
1
1
1
)1(),(
44
22
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   




 














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Note that according to point (ii) of Lemma 4 and Corollary 1 we have: 
2
),(
k
WPPW fi  . 
Thus the reproductive value of the male and female offspring of the focal female is equal to the 
reproductive value of the female carriers produced by the focal female and her “genetic brothers”.  
Both fitness measures ),( PPW ind and 
2
k
W f are biased and disregard the sons of the male carriers.  
In addition ),( PPW ind also disregards the daughters of male carriers while 
2
k
W f  disregards the 
sons of the focal female. However, according to the point (ii) of the Lemma 4 and the Corollary 
1, the impact of those factors on the female payoff is equivalent, which leads to the equivalence 
of ),( PPW ind and 
2
k
W f  as the fitness measures. 
The gene fitness function is   iig MM
k
W  1
2
, where iM  is the sex ratio in the carrier 
subpopulation of the i  -th strategy and 
P
P

1
 describes the mean number of female partners 
of a male individual. Below is the analysis of the strategic equivalence of W and Wg when the 
MSE condition is satisfied.  
 
Lemma 6: On strategic compatibility of fitness measures 
If the MSE condition is satisfied for all strategies, then the gene fitness function for any 
arbitrarily chosen strategies 1P  and 2P  has the form: 
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and the following condition is satisfied: 
 ),(),( 21 PPWPPW   if and only if ),,(),,( 21 MGPWMGPW gg  , 
 
which means that both the new and classical fitness measures are compatible with regard to the 
relation of payoff dominance of strategies. 
For a proof, see Appendix 6.  
 
Note that in Lemma 6, only the MSE condition needs to be satisfied so that both fitness functions 
can produce compatible strategic predictions. The secondary sex ratio P  may be far from 
equilibrium (which means PPpr  ). Therefore both functions are compatible on the level of static 
game theoretic analyses and the MSE is a sufficient condition for this. The question arises about 
the equivalence of both approaches on the grounds of population dynamics.  
If we assume that prPP  , then the fitness function of a gene will have the form: 
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Let us assume for simplicity that the mean brood size of a female is 2k , which will remove 
this parameter from both formulae. In effect, two functions of parameters iP  and prP are obtained: 
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Now the fitness measures can be compared. Fig. 1 shows the plots of both functions and the 
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reminder gWW  . It is clear that these functions are similar but not identical. Fig. 2 shows cross-
sections of surfaces from Fig. 1 near the equilibrium. The classical fitness measure is a linear 
function of parameter prP , whereas the new fitness measure is nonlinear. Despite disregarding the  
effect of male carriers, Lemma 6 shows that the classical fitness measure related to the number of 
grand offspring is a good approximation of reproductive success according to strategic analyses if 
the MSE condition is satisfied. However, Figures 1 and 2 show that this is a biased 
approximation, which may have serious implications when modeling detailed population 
dynamics. 
  Suppose that a mutant female produces all carriers of a mutant gene 2P  in the next generation 
according to the expression of her individual strategy. Thus, in the generation of her descendants, 
there is equality 22 PM  , and the reproductive success of a mutant gene in the first generation of 
descendants is proportional to   22 1 PP  . It is clear that the predictions of this function are 
exactly the same as in a DFSM model. This also supports the compatibility of linearization of a 
limit case of the population genetics model [5] with the DFSM approach. A problem arises in 
further generations. For each female carrying mutant gene 2P , there is some number of male 
carriers of unexpressed gene 2P , acting as fathers. The DFSM fitness measure, which is related to 
the number of a female’s grand offspring, disregards the role of male carriers on gene 
proliferation. Thus the classical fitness measure can be seriously biased in cases where an entire 
subpopulation carries a mutant gene, not only a single female (see Fig. 3). This bias may be 
strong for strategies close to 1  that produce mostly males. 
 
7. Discussion 
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7.1 The role of the MSE in sex ratio self-regulation 
Let us summarize the obtained results. The MSE plays a crucial role in sex ratio self-regulation 
by affecting the following mechanisms: 
- the "Fisherian" mechanism: 
According to Lemma 1, the state of the male subpopulation equilibrium (in which all individuals 
from the population are produced by females from this population) is equivalent to the unique 
value of the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation, equal to
ipr
i
i
PP
P
M

 . This is the connection 
between the value of the coded strategy iP  with the payoff of a gene that depends only on the sex 
ratio in the carrier subpopulation iM , and the secondary sex ratio P . Through parameter iM , the 
individual strategy iP  may affect the "Fisherian" mechanism. 
- the "Tug of War" mechanism: 
The value iM  is not a stationary point in the "tug of war" dynamics, but for the current value 
of prP , the dynamics is attracted by the point 
pri
pri
i
PP
PP
M


2ˆ , which is also determined by the state 
of the male subpopulation equilibrium. 
-the “fitness exchange” mechanism: 
The MSE is the state where all female carriers of gene iP  produce the same number of sons as 
partners of all male carriers of that gene (Lemma 4).  The reproductive value of the contribution 
of the opposite sex gene carriers to the payoff of the focal individual equals the reproductive 
value of her\his “genetic” sons (Corollary 1). 
 
- the relationship between gene frequencies and the primary sex ratio: 
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Another important relationship that is induced by the male subpopulation equilibrium is the 
equality )1( priii PPfG  . This condition, presented in Section 3 (see Lemma 3), links changes 
in gene frequencies affected by the "Fisherian mechanism" with changes in the primary sex ratio 
(the female subpopulation mean strategy). This is the missing element closing the feedback loop 
of population self-regulation. In addition for every subpopulation consisting of all carriers of 
some genes the product of a subpopulation’s primary sex ratio and the number of females per 
single male equals the analogous parameter for the whole population (Lemma 5). 
-relationship between classical and the new theory 
In the MSE state the DFSM fitness measure is equivalent to the sex specific female payoff Wf 
and both of those fitness measures are biased approximations of the gene fitness functions Wg. 
The bias increases with the fraction of males among the offspring (see Fig. 1 and 2).  
 
7.2 The relationship between subpopulation parameters and global population 
parameters induced by the MSE 
The first important property is that the MSE state is necessary in all carrier subpopulations to 
maintain equality between the primary and the secondary sex ratios during changes in gene 
frequencies. However, there is another interesting property produced by the MSE phenomenon. 
When the MSE condition is satisfied for all individual strategies, then the condition i
i
pr PP   
is satisfied. In other words, the product of the mean female subpopulation's strategy (the primary 
sex ratio) and the number of females per single male in the whole population is equal to the 
product of the strategy value Pi and the number of females per single male in the subpopulation 
of the carriers of Pi (denoted by 
i ). This result is generalized in Lemma 5, which shows that this 
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equality holds for the analogous parameter calculated for any subpopulation consisting of all 
carriers of some arbitrarily chosen subset of individual strategies. This property reveals that to 
approximate the primary sex ratio of the entire population, it is sufficient to know the primary 
and secondary sex ratios of an arbitrarily chosen subpopulation and the secondary sex ratio of the 
whole population. Empirical measurement of the sex ratio among zygotes is complicated, 
especially in a population highly diversified by individual strategies. In contrast, the secondary 
sex ratios (in effect, parameters   and  ) are easy to measure. Therefore, to calculate the 
primary sex ratio, we only need to identify a single gene (or several genes) that encodes an 
individual strategy and measure the primary sex ratio in the subpopulation of carriers of this gene 
(or genes) prP . At this point, it becomes possible to estimate the primary sex ratio of the entire 
population by 




pr
pr
P
P . The advantage of this approach is that it does not require information 
about all individual strategies in the population. However, the usefulness of this method is 
questionable because there is no information about the robustness of an MSE against differences 
in the costs of producing sons and daughters. The MSE condition can be derived because the 
mean number of offspring k  is equal for every female, which implicitly assumes equal costs of 
producing a single offspring, irrespective of sex. If we extend the model to dependence on costs 
and resources, then parameter k  will depend on the individual strategy iP . In effect, the MSE 
equilibrium will have a different form or may not exist, a possibility that requires further studies. 
7.3 The Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler model from the perspective of the new 
approach 
  It was shown that in the MSE state, the same function describes the reproductive value of the 
offspring of the focal female and the reproductive value of the female newborns produced per 
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single female carrier. Thus, DFSM fitness measure is equivalent to the reproductive value of the 
sex specific female payoff. Both approaches are biased approximations of the new approach 
related to the gene perspective. However, they are compatible with the new approach at the level 
of the strategic analyses and produce the same game theoretic predictions. A disadvantage of the 
classical sex ratio game is the fact that it disregards passive male gene carriers as fathers mating 
with other females (note that equivalent fitness measure disregards the impact of the male 
offspring). They are considered only as the sons of  “mom’s” ([9]). The strategic agent is a 
female individual. This produces a few problems. The first is a bias in estimation of the 
reproductive success which is problematic on the grounds of population dynamics. This is an 
example of the disadvantage of purely strategic models mentioned by [10] (more on this topic in 
[11,12]). In effect the basic interpretation of the payoff as the Malthusian growth rate is 
problematic in the case of the classical sex ratio game (dynamic models based on the Dussing’s 
approach can be found for example in [13]). This is an important problem, because the sex ratio 
game is a basic example of a nonlinear payoff function in every textbook on evolutionary game 
theory. A second problem is that the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (sex ratio of 0.5) is 
described as a state of the female subpopulation. The male subpopulation is not explicitly 
considered. Classical population genetics results show that the state of the male subpopulation is 
important and the sex ratio of 0.5 can be unstable for perturbations of that state [2,3,4,5]. The 
new model also supports these predictions. In the new approach the strategic agent is the gene 
encoding the sex ratio strategy. This perspective is free of the above disadvantages and leads to 
new interesting predictions such as the “tug of war” mechanism and double level selection. It is 
also consistent with classical population genetics results.    
 
7.4 The mechanistic nature of the MSE 
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Lemma 4 (see section 4) shows that in the MSE state, a group of male gene carriers produce the 
same number of genetic sons as the group of partners of these male carriers. In addition, the 
payoff of every male in the population is equal to prPk , and the payoff of a female with strategy 
iP  is equal to    ii PPk 1
2
1
. Therefore, the influence of female carriers on the payoff of a 
male carrier (described by component )( ifm
i
i PW
y
x
 of payoff function (1)) is in equilibrium (the 
same for all and equal to prP
k

2
), whereas the influence of male carriers on the payoff of a female 
is not in equilibrium (it depends on the individual strategy and is equal to iP
k

2
). The 
mechanistic explanation of this process in the male subpopulation is simple. The reproductive 
activity of male carriers is selectively neutral. Partners of every male produce the same number of 
offspring ( prP
k

2
), so the differences in payoff between males carrying different genes 
correspond to the effects of differences in their "sisters’" activities (female carriers of the same 
gene). The influence of female carriers is determined by the factor 
i
i
y
x
 (the number of female 
carriers per single male carrier). If this factor has a high value (more females per single male), 
then male carriers of this gene will experience a greater growth rate. However, when the number 
of male carriers iy  increases, then the factor 
i
i
y
x
 will decrease (see Fig. 4). This will cause a 
decrease in the influence of female carriers on the payoff of the average male carrier. This 
process will lead to an equilibrium state in which the influence of female carriers for all male 
carriers is the same. The question arises: How does this mechanism affect the female 
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subpopulation? Since the influence of a single female on the fitness of a male )( ifm PW  depends 
on the carried strategy, the equilibrium mechanism described above implies different values of 
factor 
i
i
y
x
 that describe the per capita number of females per single male. The influence of a 
single male on the fitness of a female mfW  is independent of the carried strategy. Differences in 
the contributions of male carriers to female fitness are determined by different values of the 
coefficient 
i
i
x
y
 (describing the number of male carriers per single female) for different strategies. 
Female carriers of different strategies exert continual pressure on the equilibrium state of a male 
subpopulation by introducing different numbers of new male carriers. In effect, through this 
subtle population mechanism, female individuals indirectly influence the feedback of male 
carriers on their own fitness and thus control the contribution of male carriers to their own fitness 
(Lemma 4 (ii)). In addition, this outcome leads to different sex ratio values in carrier 
subpopulations when the entire population is in the MSE. 
 
The results presented above attempt to interpret the MSE phenomenon. They suggest that 
the MSE constitutes a compensatory equilibrium between the production of female carriers of a 
gene by male carriers and the production of male carriers by female individuals (a fitness 
exchange effect). As was mentioned in the introduction, the MSE is an example of a more general 
class of problems. The MSE is related to population phenomena, such as stable demographic 
structure or Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In the new model, there is no demographic structure. 
However, existing models that include demographic structure [14] report different behaviors 
before and after demographic equilibrium is reached. The results from this paper also suggest that 
the male subpopulation equilibrium is the state to which the population rapidly converges when 
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all individuals in the population are produced only by females from this population (no migration 
or other external factors). The MSE properties presented in this paper represent effects of haploid 
inheritance and the assumption that an individual strategy is encoded by a single gene. However, 
other forms of self-regulation structures are possible for different inheritance systems (diploid or 
haplodiploid) and different genetic structures (multilocus or polygenic). Here strategic analysis of 
phenotypic adaptation meets population genetics. Strictly genetic mechanisms may play 
important roles in the process of phenotypic selection by determining the values of crucial 
parameters (e.g., the sex ratio in a carrier subpopulation) that are responsible for the selection of 
individual strategies. Similar dynamic equilibria should be observed in every model where there 
are passive carriers of unexpressed strategy genes. 
 
This work was supported by grant N N304 2764 33 from the Polish Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education. 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Assume that the male subpopulation equilibrium condition iipri PfPm   is satisfied. Recall that 
i
i
i
G
Pm
M       






P
GM
m iii   and 
i
i
i
G
fP
M
)1(
1

       








P
GM
f iii
1
)1(
.                (21) 
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Then the MSE condition can be written in the form: 
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then: 
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thus 
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The male subpopulation equilibrium condition is therefore equivalent to the following sex ratio 
value in the carrier subpopulation: 
 
ipr
i
i
PP
P
M

          
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1
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The last question addresses when equality PPpr   can be maintained despite changes in gene 
frequencies iG . Recall that jjjjpr PGM
P
P )1(
1
1


  and jjj MGP  (see section 2 in [7]). 
Equality of the primary and the secondary sex ratios therefore has the form: 
 jjjjjjj MGPGM
P


)1(
1
1
.  
 
The above equality will be independent of the value of jG  if for all j , equality between the j -th 
coefficients of the sum is satisfied. Then jG  reduces. In effect, we obtain: 
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 j
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From this formula we obtain: 
 
 
j
j
j
PP
P
M


1
.  
After substituting PPpr  , we obtain condition on jM , which is equivalent to the sex ratio in the 
carrier subpopulation equivalent to the MSE state. This means that MSE state is necessary 
condition to maintain equality between the primary and the secondary sex ratios during changes 
in gene frequencies.  
 
Appendix 2 
Proof of Lemma 2 
 
Because 
x
x
f ii   and
y
y
m ii  , according to the MSE condition (10), we have 
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i
i P
P
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
,                                                                                                              (22) 
 where 
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 and 
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P
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
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1
. The equation for the sex ratio in the carrier 
subpopulation (8) has the form: 
      iiiiprii MPMMPM
k
M  1
2
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For every value of iM  from the interior of the unit interval, the right hand side of this equation 
can be presented in the form: 
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 Thus by substitution of (22), we can transform (23) to: 
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Let us find the zero point from the interior of the unit interval of the right side of the equation 
transformed to the above formula: 
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In effect, we obtain the zero point: 
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Thus point a) is proven. 
 Substitution of 5.0prP  and prPP   implies: 
 ii MM
ˆ     for all  i ,  
which constitutes the end of the proof.    
 
Appendix 3 
Proof of Lemma 3 
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 Gi  can be presented in the form (see [7] section 2): 
 iii fPPmG )1(  .  
By substituting 
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i
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P
fm   (according to MSE condition (10)) and prPP  , we obtain: 
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This is the relationship between iG  and if . Let us focus on the dynamics of parameter iG  (7): 
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P i  is responsible for the sign of the right side of this equation. We 
have assumed that the primary and the secondary sex ratios and that the MSE condition (10) is 
satisfied. Thus, by substituting prPP   and condition (12) 
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Because 
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P
P )1()1( 


 , The right hand side of equation (7) equals to: 
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 .  
 
Because   and )1( iPP   are always nonnegative, the sign of the formula above describing the 
right side of equation iG
  is determined by the product: 
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  pripr PPP 






2
1
.  
 
Therefore, 
 
 iG   increases when  
2
1
prP    and   ipr PP     or   
2
1
prP    and   ipr PP    
 iG   decreases when  
2
1
 pri PP    or    
2
1
 pri PP  
 iG   is stable when  0iG   or  pri PP    or  
2
1
prP , 
which ends this proof.     
 
Appendix 4 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Because 
x
x
f ii   and
y
y
m ii  , from the MSE condition (10), we have 
 i
i
jjj
i P
x
x
Pf
y
y
 . 
Thus 
i
pr
i
i
P
P
y
x
  (then
pr
i
i
i
P
P
x
y

 ).  
When we substitute this coefficient to payoff functions of males, which take the form (in terms of 
auxiliary symbols   and prP ) kP
y
x
kPW
y
x
WW i
i
i
prfm
i
i
mmm 5.05.0  , 
then coefficient kP
y
x
i
i
i 5.0 , which describes the per capita normalized number of new male 
individuals produced by female carriers of strategy iP , will be equal to kPpr5.0 . In effect, 
kPW prm  , which is the proof of point (i). 
33 
 
The analogous operation for the female payoff function takes the form: 
  kP
x
y
kPW
x
y
WW pr
i
i
imf
i
i
fff  15.0)1(5.0 . 
By substituting the transformed MSE condition 
pr
i
i
i
P
P
x
y

   in this function, we 
obtain k
P
P
PW
x
y
pr
pr
imf
i
i


1
5.0 . After the substitution of the condition PPpr  , we obtain 
kPk
P
P
PW
x
y
iimf
i
i 

 5.0
1
5.0 . In effect, the female payoff function will have the form 
   ii PPk 12
1 , which is the proof of point (ii). 
Since 
x
x
f ii  , 
y
y
m ii   and 
y
x
 , the MSE condition jjjiii PfmPf   can be described as:  
kPykPx priii   
The left side of this formula describes the number of male individuals produced by all female 
carriers of gene iP , and the right side describes the number of male individuals produced by 
female partners of male carriers of the gene, which is the proof of point (iii). 
 
Appendix 5 
Proof of Lemma 5 
Recall that the subpopulation   is described by the vector of indices ],...,[ 1


 
u
ddd . Thus 
id
x  
 
id
y  is the number of females (males) with strategy id  and 
x
x
f i
i
d
d

    










y
y
m i
i
d
d
is the 
respective frequency in the female (male) subpopulation. The average female strategy in the 
subpopulation   is 





id
i P
x
x
P
d
ipr , where 

id
i xx , denotes the number of females in 
subpopulation   and 

id
i yy  represents the number of males. When we sum up the MSE 
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conditions (10) of all strategies in subpopulation , we obtain: 
   
iii dd
ijjjdi
PfPfm .  
 
In terms of exact numbers instead of related frequencies, this formula takes the form: 
 
x
Px
Pf
y
y
iii dd
i
jjj
di 



 .  
 
Then 
 
x
P
x
x
x
Pf
y
y i
i
d
d
i
jjj




 
 .  
 
When we multiply this condition by 
y
x
, we obtain: 
 


 prpr P
y
x
P
y
x
  
 
that is, 
 
 prpr PP ,  
 
constituting the end of the proof. 
    
Appendix 6  
Proof of Lemma 6 
The gene fitness function has the form: 
   iiig MM
k
MGPW  1
2
),,( .  
 
According to Lemma 1, the sex ratios in carrier subpopulations are affected by male 
subpopulation equilibrium and according to the results from [6] rapidly converge to: 
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ipr
i
i
PP
P
M

 . 
When we substitute iM  to ),,( MGPW ig , we obtain: 
 
























ipr
iiipr
ipr
i
ipr
i
ig
PP
PPPPk
PP
P
PP
Pk
MGPW
2
1
2
),,(   
 
 



























i
pr
ipr
ipr
ipr
P
P
PPk
PP
PPk
22
.  
Thus the gene fitness function will then have the form: 
 ),,( MGPW ig















i
pr
ipr
P
P
PPk
2
.  
In effect: 
 
when 1
1


, then a higher iP  will have higher fitness (maximized by  1iP ) 
 when  1
1


, then a lower iP   will have higher fitness (maximized by  0iP ). 
Because  
P
P

1
, equilibrium point 1  is equivalent to 5.0P  and above rule has the 
following form: 
  when  5.0P , then a higher iP   will have higher fitness (maximized by  1iP ) 
  when  5.0P , then a lower iP   will have higher fitness (maximized by  0iP ). 
This means that it is profitable to produce the sex which is currently in the minority. This 
condition is fully compatible with the classical theory, thus ending the proof. 
 
List of important symbols: 
 y   - number of males 
 x   - number of females 
 u   - number of individual strategies 
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x
x
f ii    - frequency of females with strategy  iP   
 
y
y
m ii     frequency of males with strategy  iP   
 ],...,[ 1 ufff    - vector of the state of the female subpopulation 
 ],...,[ 1 ummm     vector of the state of the male subpopulation 
 
xy
y
P

   - frequency of males in the population 
 
P
P
y
x 

1
   - number of females per single male individual (auxiliary parameter) 
 jjjpr PfP     - mean strategy in the female subpopulation 
   iii fPPmG  1   - frequency of a gene encoding  i  th strategy 
 ],...,[ 1 uGGG    - vector of a state of a gene pool 
 
ii
i
i
fPPm
Pm
M
)1( 
   - fraction of males in the subpopulation of carriers of the  i  th strategy 
 







  i
i
i
jjjim
P
m
f
Pf
P
P
kmfPPW
2
1
),,,(   - male payoff function 
      





 jjj
i
i
iif Pf
f
m
P
k
mfPPW 11
2
,,,   - female payoff function 
   iiig MM
k
MGPW  1
2
),,(   - fitness function of a gene encoding strategy  iP   
 
 
Figure legends: 
 
Fig .1 Comparison of static fitness measures generated by the new model and used in classical 
theory. a) Plot of the classical Dusing-Fisher fitness measure denoted by W . b) Plot of a fitness 
measure generated by the new model denoted by gW  (when the MSE condition is satisfied). c) 
Plot of differences between fitness measures, gWW  . iP  defines the individual strategy and prP  
defines the primary sex ratio. 
 
Fig. 2 Sections of surfaces from Figure 1. The classical fitness measure is a linear function of 
parameter P , whereas the new fitness measure is nonlinear. a) Plot of the classical Dusing-Fisher 
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fitness measure denoted by W . b) Plot of a fitness measure generated by the new model denoted 
by gW  (when the MSE condition is satisfied) c) Plot of differences between both fitness 
measures gWW  .  
Fig. 3 The classic DFSM fitness measure is fully compatible with predictions of the new model 
only in the case of a single unique mutant female. In the next generation, all carriers of a mutant 
gene are her offspring and the sex ratio in the population of her descendants carrying the mutant 
gene is equal to the value of expression of her strategy (see Figure a – a female with strategy 3/7). 
In further generations, there are a number of male carriers of a mutant gene (see Fig b), whose 
number depends on strategies represented by their partners. The offspring of these males are 
disregarded by classical theory, whereas the new model takes them into consideration. Bias of the 
classical fitness measure caused by the influence of males on a gene’s reproductive success may 
lead to differences in the predictions of both theories. 
Fig. 4 Mechanistic explanation of the male subpopulation equilibrium. Partners of every male 
produce the same number of offspring carrying his gene ( prP
k

2
), so the differences in payoff 
are the effects of differences in the activity of female carriers of the same gene. The influence of 
female carriers is determined by the factor 
i
i
y
x
 (the number of female carriers per single male 
carrier). If this factor has a high value (more females per single male), then male carriers of this 
gene will have a larger growth rate (this situation is presented in panel a). However, when the 
number of male carriers iy  increases, then factor 
i
i
y
x
 will decrease, which will cause a decrease 
in the influence of female carriers of the gene on the payoff of the average male carrier of the 
same gene (panel b). This process will lead to an equilibrium state in which the influence of 
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female carriers on all male carriers is the same. 
 
 
Fig. 1 
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Fig. 2 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 
